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Abstract – Beginning in 2003, highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus spread across
Southeast Asia, causing unprecedented epidemics. Thailand was massively infected in 2004 and 2005 and
continues today to experience sporadic outbreaks. While research ﬁndings suggest that the spread of HPAI
H5N1 is inﬂuenced primarily by trade patterns, identifying the anthropogenic risk factors involved remains
a challenge. In this study, we investigated which anthropogenic factors played a role in the risk of HPAI in
Thailand using outbreak data from the ‘‘second wave’’ of the epidemic (3 July 2004 to 5 May 2005) in the
country. We ﬁrst performed a spatial analysis of the relative risk of HPAI H5N1 at the subdistrict level based
on a hierarchical Bayesian model. We observed a strong spatial heterogeneity of the relative risk. We then
tested a set of potential risk factors in a multivariable linear model. The results conﬁrmed the role of free-
grazing ducks and rice-cropping intensity but showed a weak association with ﬁghting cock density. The
results also revealed a set of anthropogenic factors signiﬁcantly linked with the risk of HPAI. High risk was
associated strongly with densely populated areas, short distances to a highway junction, and short distances
to large cities. These ﬁndings highlight a new explanatory pattern for the risk of HPAI and indicate that, in
addition to agro-environmental factors, anthropogenic factors play an important role in the spread of H5N1.
To limit the spread of future outbreaks, efforts to control the movement of poultry products must be
sustained.
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1. INTRODUCTION
After emerging in southern China in the mid-
1990s, the highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
(HPAI) H5N1 virus spread across east and
Southeast Asia, causing unprecedented epidem-
ics in 2003–2004 [13]. As of 24 September
2009, the virus has caused 442 human cases,
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with 262 deaths worldwide1. Controlling the
spread of H5N1 disease in poultry may contrib-
ute to the reduction of risk for humans [27] by
preventing the emergence of a viral form with
efﬁcient human-to-human transmission capable
of triggering a global pandemic [13]. Determin-
ing the factors involved in the spread of H5N1
in poultry and producing risk maps are critical
to disease control as they would enable control
measures to be targeted and surveillance in
‘‘high-risk’’ areas to be strengthened. The HPAI
H5N1 virus is now well established in the poul-
try population in Asia, where the virus has been
able to maintain itself and spread as well as peri-
odically re-emerge. The main pathways that
have been identiﬁed for the spread of H5N1
are the migration and trade of wild birds and
the transport of poultry and poultry products
[12]. However, the respective roles of these
pathways at the global or national scale are still
unclear [12, 18]. The persistence of HPAI H5N1
virus in Southeast Asia has been linked to a spe-
ciﬁc agro-ecosystem [9] that associates free-
grazing ducks with rice cultivation. A separate
study found that the risk of HPAI outbreaks
was reduced in areas with agricultural activities
other than rice farming [10]. Free-grazing ducks
form a reservoir of HPAI H5N1 in Asia [29] and
may contribute to the spread of the virus when
they are moved among rice ﬁelds which also
constitute a habitat for wild waterfowl [8]. In
addition to free-grazing ducks, it is likely that
backyard poultry raised in low biosecurity sys-
tems and ﬁghting cocks are involved in the dif-
fusion of the virus [8]; however, their roles are
still unclear. Research to date suggests that the
spread of HPAI H5N1 is inﬂuenced primarily
by human activities related to poultry produc-
tion and poultry trading [18], however, little is
known about the underlying processes involved.
Live poultry markets probably play a role in the
maintenance of the virus in Asia [26, 28] and the
movement of poultry within trade chains may
have facilitated the spread of the HPAI H5N1
virus.
In Southeast Asia, Thailand was affected by
HPAI H5N1 early, with the ﬁrst ofﬁcial report
of poultry and human outbreaks on 23 January
2004. By the end of January 2004, 32 provinces
throughout the north and several in the south
experienced outbreaks in many types of poultry.
The disease caused 17humancases fromJanuary
2004 to June 20052. The epidemic peaked dur-
ing a ‘‘second wave’’ with 1 717 outbreaks in
poultry. Beginning in early 2004, Thai authori-
ties implemented a control strategy based on the
prohibition of vaccination and the use of pre-
emptive culling. Approximately 60 million
poultry were culled during the ﬁrst wave, with
stamping-out measures applied inside a 5-km
radius around an outbreak. From July 2004,
culling was restricted to suspected farms or
villages; 3 million poultry were destroyed dur-
ing the second wave of outbreaks. The move-
ment of poultry and poultry products was also
restricted around infected areas and ﬁghting
cocks and free-grazing ducks were targeted by
control measures. Apart from these control
strategies, the Thai authorities strengthened
the surveillance of HPAI. In addition to the pas-
sive surveillance system and routine laboratory
surveillance, the Government implemented an
intensive survey known as the ‘‘X-ray cam-
paign’’ in October 2004 with 990 000 volun-
teers conducting door-to-door surveys [23] to
check poultry in every house nationwide. From
mid-2005, the number of outbreaks in poultry
decreased substantially but the occurrence of
poultry outbreaks in two provinces of Thailand
in late 2008 indicates that the threat of HPAI in
Thailand remains present.
The fact that surveillance was strengthened
in response to the large HPAI epidemic makes
Thailand a prime place to analyse which factors
play an important role in the spread of the dis-
ease. A set of environmental risk factors was
identiﬁed in Thailand [8], but aside from the
1 WHO, Cumulative number of conﬁrmed human
cases of avian inﬂuenza A/(H5N1) reported to
WHO [on line] (2009) http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/avian_inﬂuenza/country/cases_table_2009_
09_24/en/index.html [consulted 4 November 2009].
2 WHO, Cumulative number of conﬁrmed human
cases of avian inﬂuenza A/(H5N1) reported to
WHO [on line] (2009) http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/avian_inﬂuenza/country/cases_table_2005_
06_08/en/index.html [consulted 4 November 2009].
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ﬁndings of Tiensin et al. [24], little has been
learned about anthropogenic risk factors in the
country. Some aspects of the role of human
activities in HPAI risk were recently reported
from Vietnam [19]. The discovery of HPAI
H5N1 in Thai poultry markets in 2006 and
2007 [2] suggests that the HPAI virus has con-
tinued to spread among poultry through trade
activities despite the presence of control mea-
sures. Apart from the duck-rice agro-ecosystem
which has been shown to be a source of infec-
tion, the role of humans in the spread of HPAI
H5N1 has not yet been fully investigated. The
risk of HPAI varies spatially according to the
anthropogenic characteristics of the different
geographical areas of interest, each character-
ized by a variety of human activities such as
poultry farming practices, trade activities and
market rules, land use and agro-ecosystems,
and veterinary services structure and control.
The objective of the present work was to study,
through a spatial approach, the risk factors of
HPAI H5N1 linked to human activities. It com-
plements previous work by identifying the
high-risk areas of HPAI H5N1 in Thailand
and by determining which anthropogenic
factors are associated with an increased risk.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Data
The subdistrict (an administrative unit covering an
average area of 69.7 km2, called ‘‘Tambon’’ in Thaı¨)
was used as the spatial scale of interest for the study.
Out of the 7 408 subdistricts in Thailand, we
excluded from the analysis those located on islands
since we assumed that they played a minor role in
disease distribution. This resulted in a geo-database
of 7 366 subdistricts which we considered as the
statistical units for the analysis.
Epidemiological data relevant to HPAI H5N1 out-
breaks in poultry were provided by the Avian Inﬂu-
enza Control Center, Department of Livestock
Development (DLD, Bangkok, Thailand), a unit in
charge of surveillance and monitoring of avian inﬂu-
enza (AI) in poultry. Since January 2004, DLD has
been recording information on all poultry outbreaks
conﬁrmed by a diagnostic test. Tests were carried
out by diagnostic laboratories on sick or dead poultry
or cloacal samples using reverse-transcriptase poly-
merase chain reaction and virus isolation [22]. We
restricted the study to outbreaks in chickens and
ducks which occurred during the second wave of
HPAI because at that point both the passive and
active components of the surveillance system were
fully implemented to detect the disease. The data
included records of 1 717 laboratory-conﬁrmed cases
(ﬂocks of affected poultry) dating from 3 July 2004
to 5 May 2005. The background susceptible popula-
tion was calculated for each subdistrict based on the
poultry census data that DLD collected during the
X-ray survey of February 2005. This was used to
model the relative risk. We computed several anthro-
pogenic factors to investigate the role of humans in
disease spread since poultry product trading activities
operate at different geographic scales. To take into
account these different commercial activities, we built
anthropogenic indicators based on the road network
and human population settlements. Using the 2004
human population census database of the Thailand
Department of Provincial Administration3, we calcu-
lated the human population density in subdistricts to
study its association with the relative risk of HPAI,
previous papers having found differing results regard-
ing the effect of human population density on HPAI
[8, 24]. In addition, we computed the distance from
the subdistrict to major cities (deﬁned as having a
population of 100 000 or more). We believed that
major cities may have played a role in disease spread
due to the intensity of poultry trade in the areas sur-
rounding them. Information on the road network (pri-
mary and secondary roads, highways) was obtained
from the Ministry of Transport, Bangkok, Thailand.
This information made it possible to compute the
road density per subdistrict (grouping primary and
secondary roads) which was taken as an indicator
of the intensity of the local trade of poultry products
within a subdistrict. We suspected that highways
played a role not only in the long-distance spread
of the virus through the dispersal of infected materi-
als, but also in the short-distance spread to subdis-
tricts located in their vicinity. Therefore, we
introduced the distance of a subdistrict to the closest
highway as an explanatory variable. Finally, we com-
puted the distance to the closest highway junction,
which was assumed to function as a ‘‘dissemination
node’’ for the HPAI virus. We assumed that if the
virus was transported mainly through the road
network, the subdistricts located close to a highway
3 Department of Provincial Administration, Statis-
tics on Human population [on line] http://www.dopa.
go.th/xstat/popyear.html [consulted 4 November 2009]
(in Thai).
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junction were more likely to come in contact with
the virus than those located further away. To take
into account environmental risk factors, we used
topographic data (altitude, hydrology) which
were obtained from the 1996 digital database of
the Thailand Environment Research Institute4
(Bangkok). Research has shown that rice-cropping
intensity is a relevant risk factor in Thailand and other
Asian countries [9]. Therefore, we included maps of
rice-cropping intensity based on MODIS sensor
images processed from satellite-based mapping algo-
rithms developed by Xiao et al. [30]. Using data from
the DLD poultry census, we also estimated for each
subdistrict the density of animals and households
raising poultry for different types of poultry: native
chickens, ﬁghting cocks, broiler and layer chickens,
free-grazing ducks, and broiler and layer ducks.
All data were integrated into a geographical data-
base and geoprocessing was carried out with the Spa-
tial Analyst extension of ArcGIS software v.9.1
(ESRI Inc.) and HawthsTools software, v.3.27
(Hawth’s Analysis Tools, 2002–2006).
2.2. Modelling the relative risk
Disease modelling and mapping was performed
for the whole of Thailand at the subdistrict level.
We ran two parallel models (one for chickens, one
for ducks) since we assumed that the respective spa-
tial patterns for chickens and ducks were different.
We aimed to produce disease maps based on ‘‘rela-
tive risk’’, which was taken to be a ratio of the risk
of HPAI in a given subdistrict to the average risk
nationwide. The latter was estimated from the overall
number of cases and the poultry farm population in
Thailand. Due to the widely varying number of poul-
try farms in each subdistrict, and because of spatial
dependency between the subdistricts [17], we applied
the hierarchical Bayesian approach described by
Besag et al. [3] to the HPAI H5N1 data. This method
made it possible to compute area-speciﬁc relative risk
estimates [17] while considering spatial interactions
through a spatial smoothing based on a Gaussian
auto-regressive model [3]. We used a ﬁrst order spa-
tial interaction neighbourhood based on the contigu-
ity between the spatial units. The original method in
Besag et al. [3] uses a Poisson distribution to model
the occurrence of cases, which is appropriate for rare,
non-contagious diseases such as cancers in humans
[15] or bovine spongiform encephalopathy in cattle
[1]. However, due to the contagiousness of HPAI
within each spatial unit, applying this method to
HPAI would result in overdispersion compared to
the Poisson distribution. We handled this problem
by modelling the locally observed number of cases
using a negative binomial distribution [14], an
approach that has been used to model inﬂuenza
by Fraser et al. [7]. Monte Carlo Markov Chain
(MCMC) simulations were used to estimate the
parameters of the model, including the estimate of
relative risk for each spatial unit [16]. The estimation
was performed using LinBugs [21], with 1 million
iterations, each producing a random simulation of
the relative risk for all of the statistical units (e.g. sub-
districts). Geweke and Heidelberger–Welch tests
were used to assess the convergence of the models
[5]. Considering a long safety burn-in period, param-
eters were estimated from a subset of 3 000 of the
random simulations (with a systematic step of 1 over
3 to overcome auto-correlation problems). From this
subset of 3 000 simulations, we computed credible
intervals containing 95% of the values of relative
risk. We tested the link between the relative risk val-
ues in subdistricts on chickens and ducks using a
Spearman rank order correlation test. The relative risk
was mapped for chickens and ducks using ArcGIS
software v.9.1 (ESRI Inc.). Maps made it possible
to identify groups of subdistricts with either a signif-
icantly high or a signiﬁcantly low risk of HPAI-
infected ﬂocks compared to the rest of the country.
2.3. Study of spatial risk factors
We aimed to identify the factors associated with
the spatial risk of HPAI. To do so, we constructed a
linear model with ﬁxed effects. We used the logarithm
of the relative risk estimated through the Bayesian
approach (which modelled the exponential of relative
risk values through a Gaussian distribution in each
statistical unit, as mentioned by Besag et al. [3]) as
the dependent variable. Separate models of HPAI
outbreaks were constructed for the chicken and
duck populations. Each of the two models contained
18 variables which included environmental, poultry
farming, and anthropogenic factors. Multicollinearity
was investigated by checking the standard errors of
regression coefﬁcients and the variance inﬂation
factors (VIF) [6]. The density of native chickens
and the density of farms with native chickens were
found to be positively correlated; consequently, only
the former was introduced into the analysis. Multicol-
linearity was ﬁnally assumed not to cause any seri-
ous problem in the model (VIF values < 5.1) [6].
4 Thailand Environment Institute, Thailand on a
disk: Digital Database for Use with PC ArcInfo
and/or ArcView (CD-ROM), Thailand Environ-
ment Research Institute, Bangkok, 1996.
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Since we expected some non-linear relationships, con-
tinuous variables were transformed into categorical
data before they were entered into the model. Four
categories were chosen for each variable with the
exception of free-grazing ducks (density of animals
and density of farms) whose distribution allowed only
3 categories. We selected the thresholds that simulta-
neously ﬁtted the non-linear relationships and had a
sufﬁcient number of statistical units per category.
Finally, we added the level of relative risk in the duck
population as a covariate in the chicken model and
vice versa for the duck model. For each species, this
thereby made it possible to adjust the analysis to
account for the level of disease occurrence in the other
species. The multivariate analysis was carried out
using a stepwise backward elimination process; the
signiﬁcance of each variable in the full model was
assessed in turn, with the least signiﬁcant variable
deleted and the process repeated until all of the
remaining variables were signiﬁcant at p value 0.05
(Fisher test) [6]. From the effect estimates computed
in the ﬁnal linear model, we deduced values of risk
ratios (RR) and their conﬁdence intervals (95%) for
the different variables. For each variable, the reference
category was deﬁned as the category expected to be at
the lowest level of risk based on our hypothesis and
ﬁndings of previous studies in Thailand [8, 24].
Although spatial dependence already had been taken
into account through the spatial contiguity in the
Bayesian approach, we looked for any remaining
spatial autocorrelation in the linear models. The
semi-variograms of model residuals showed that auto-
correlation may have played a role only in a very
short-distance range (2 250 m). Computing the dis-
tances between each subdistrict to the next nearest
subdistrict, we found that only a small portion of
subdistricts (< 5%) actually had a chance of being
inﬂuenced by their neighbours within that range. Thus
the likelihood that spatial autocorrelation affected the
results was assumed to be low. The statistical analysis
was performed using R software v.2.9.25.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Mapping the relative risk
Out of the 1 717 HPAI H5N1 outbreaks
reported in Thailand between 3 July 2004 and
5 May 2005, 1 158 outbreaks were reported
in the chicken population (5 451 643 farms or
households with chickens in Thailand) and
495 in the duck population (728 750 farms or
households with ducks). Figure 1 shows the
geographical distribution of HPAI outbreaks
in chicken and duck ﬂocks during this time
period. Figure 2 presents the spatially smoothed
relative risk maps for chickens and ducks
and shows that the two maps resemble each
other fairly closely (Spearman rho = 0.91,
p < 1e16). The maps visually conﬁrm the
presence of a ‘‘hot spot’’ of HPAI risk in the
central plain of Thailand where the relative risk
was signiﬁcantly higher than the national aver-
age (relative risk > 10 for both chickens and
ducks). For ducks, however, the high-risk area
tended to extend further across the western part
of the central plain of Thailand. In contrast, the
extreme south of Thailand appeared to be a
high-risk area for chickens, with values of rela-
tive risk signiﬁcantly > 10. On the contrary,
some areas were especially low-risk for both
chickens and ducks despite the occurrence of
outbreaks (relative risk signiﬁcantly < 0.5), as
in northeastern Thailand and in the middle part
of the peninsula. Northern Thailand had low
values of relative risk (signiﬁcantly < 0.5) only
for chickens.
3.2. Spatial risk factors
We focussed on the RR values and high-
lighted the variables with high or very low
RR. The estimated effects of the environmental,
poultry farming and anthropogenic risk factors
are displayed in Tables Ia, Ib and Ic. The level
of relative risk of HPAI for ducks was the main
risk factor associated with the relative risk for
chickens, and vice versa. Apart from this, the
mean number of rice crops per year was the
most relevant risk factor for the relative risk
of HPAI for both chickens and ducks. A low
average altitude in a subdistrict ( 50 m) was
also found to be a risk factor of HPAI for
chickens and ducks, while medium altitude
was associated to RR below 1. A high density
of free-grazing ducks appeared to be one of
the main risk factors for HPAI. For chickens
and ducks, the HPAI risk was connected more
closely to animal density than to the density
of farms or households with poultry. Areas with
5 The R Foundation for Statistical Computing,
2009.
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a high density of broiler and layer ducks were
associated with a strong increase in the relative
risk for both chickens and ducks (RR > 4 for
subdistricts with more than 80 ducks per
km2). A high density of broiler and layer chick-
ens (> 500 chickens per km2) was found to be
associated with a high risk of HPAI (RR > 3)
only in the duck model. Our results demon-
strated a relationship between a high density
of native chickens and a low risk of HPAI
H5N1 for both chickens and ducks. To a lesser
extent, a high density of ﬁghting cocks was
found to be associated with an increase in the
HPAI risk for both species. The role of several
anthropogenic factors related to proximity to
main transportation axes and major cities
(Fig. 3) still remained strong after adjusting
for the effects of the other variables. We found
that a high HPAI risk was strongly associated
with highly-populated areas, short distances to
the highway junction (< 20 km), and a high
density of roads in a subdistrict. Moreover,
the HPAI risk decreased when the distance
radius to major cities (with a human population
Figure 1. Number of outbreaks per subdistrict in chicken and duck ﬂocks in Thailand from 3 July 2004 to 5
May 2005. (A color version of this ﬁgure is available at www.vetres.org.)
Vet. Res. (2010) 41:28 M. Paul et al.
Page 6 of 14 (page number not for citation purpose)
of over 100 000) increased. To a lesser extent, a
very short distance to the closest highway
(< 5 km) was also associated signiﬁcantly with
a higher HPAI risk for chickens and ducks.
4. DISCUSSION
We used Bayesian spatial analysis to charac-
terise HPAI risk areas in Thailand during the
second wave of the HPAI H5N1 epidemic
and to explore the link between anthropogenic
factors and the relative risk of HPAI. We
focussed on risk factors that contributed to the
spread of HPAI H5N1. This analysis shows
that, when adjusted for the effects of environ-
mental and poultry variables, several anthropo-
genic factors were signiﬁcantly associated with
an increased risk of HPAI in both chicken and
duck populations.
First, we generated maps of the relative risk
of HPAI H5N1 for chicken and duck ﬂocks,
and showed that the spatial pattern for chickens
and ducks was similar. This indicated that
chickens and ducks either infected each other
or shared the same spatial source of infection.
Figure 2. Relative risk of HPAI H5N1 for chicken and duck ﬂocks in Thailand from 3 July 2004 to 5 May
2005. Relative risk was computed from hierarchical Bayesian modelling at the subdistrict level. (A color
version of this ﬁgure is available at www.vetres.org.)
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Table I. Results of the multivariate analysis for factors associated with risk of HPAI H5N1 in chicken and
duck ﬂocks from 3 July 2004 to 5 May 2005 in Thailand (p  0.05).
Variable Categories Number of
subdistricts
Chicken ﬂocks Duck ﬂocks
Risk ratio 95% CI Risk ratio 95% CI
(a) Environmental factors
Relative risk for ducks
 0.5 2 769 1.00
0.51–1.5 825 0.76 0.63–0.91
1.51–10 1 310 1.86 1.55–2.22
 10.01 2 462 13.11 10.92–15.73
Relative risk for chickens
 0.5 3 175 1.00
0.51–1.5 633 1.10 0.86–1.42
1.51–10 1 824 6.13 4.83–7.78
 10.01 1 734 33.86 26.33–43.53
Average altitude (m)
 400.01 632 1.00 1.00
150.01–400 2 605 0.38 0.32–0.45 0.27 0.21–0.34
50.01–150 1 701 0.53 0.45–0.63 0.24 0.19–0.30
 50 2 428 5.73 4.77–6.90 10.16 7.89–13.09
Mean number of rice crops per year
 0.2 1 167 1.00 1.00
0.21–1 2 405 0.77 0.65–0.92 0.88 0.70–1.10
1.01–1.5 3 308 1.47 1.24–1.76 1.12 0.88–1.42
 1.51 486 11.21 9.15–13.73 17 12.89–22.42
Distance to the closest river (km)
 10.01 1 328 1.00 1.00
5.01–10 1 509 0.68 0.57–0.82 0.59 0.47–0.75
2.01–5 1 966 0.83 0.69–0.99 0.74 0.58–0.94
 2 2 563 2.05 1.71–2.46 2.88 2.25–3.69
(b) Poultry farming factors
Density of native chickens (no poultry/km2)
 50 1 441 1.00 1.00
50.01–100 1 324 1.12 0.94–1.33 1.57 1.24–2.00
100.01–300 3 319 0.73 0.61–0.87 0.52 0.41–0.66
 300.01 1 282 0.52 0.43–0.63 0.46 0.36–0.60
Density of ﬁghting cocks (no poultry/km2)
 0.1 4 191 1.00 1.00
0.11–1 1 682 0.59 0.50–0.71 0.53 0.42–0.67
1.01–3 832 0.75 0.62–0.91 0.62 0.48–0.80
 3.01 661 1.52 1.24–1.87 2.3 1.75–3.03
Density of houses with ﬁghting cocks (no house/km2)
 0.01 3 152 1.00 1.00
0.01–0.1 2 163 0.67 0.56–0.79 0.69 0.55–0.87
0.11–0.4 1 439 0.86 0.71–1.04 0.73 0.57–0.94
 0.41 612 1.26 1.01–1.54 1.59 1.21–2.10
Density of free-grazing ducks (no poultry/km2)
 0.1 5 953 1.00 1.00
0.11–10 779 0.68 0.57–0.83 0.37 0.29–0.48
 10.01 634 10.13 8.29–12.37 18.26 13.88–24.04
Continued on next page
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Table I. Continued.
Variable Categories Number of
subdistricts
Chicken ﬂocks Duck ﬂocks
Risk ratio 95% CI Risk ratio 95% CI
Density of farms with free-grazing ducks (no farm/km2)
 0.001 4 539 1.00 n.s. n.s.
0.0011–0.05 1 367 0.65 0.54–0.78 n.s. n.s.
 0.051 1 460 1.61 1.33–1.96 n.s. n.s.
Density of broiler and layer chickens (no poultry/km2)
 1 2 997 n.s. n.s. 1.00
1.01–50 2 475 n.s. n.s. 0.78 0.61–0.98
50.01–500 1 076 n.s. n.s. 0.68 0.53–0.88
 500.01 818 n.s. n.s. 3.04 2.34–3.95
Density of farms with broiler and layer chickens (no farm/km2)
 0.01 932 1.00 1.00
0.011–0.05 1 092 0.78 0.65–0.93 0.75 0.59–0.94
0.051–1 4 794 1.01 0.85–1.21 1.03 0.81–1.31
 1.01 548 0.61 0.50–0.75 0.66 0.50–0.87
Density of broiler and layer ducks (no poultry/km2)
 5 3 374 1.00 1.00
5.01–20 2 195 0.96 0.80–1.15 0.62 0.49–0.79
20.01–80 1 222 0.97 0.81–1.17 0.51 0.39–0.65
 80.01 575 4.6 3.76–5.63 6.85 5.19–9.04
Density of farms with broiler and layer ducks (no farm/km2)
 0.5 3 228 1.00 1.00
0.51–1 1 471 1.41 1.18–1.69 1.32 1.03–1.69
1.01–2 1 423 1.22 1.02–1.47 0.88 0.69–1.13
 2.01 1 244 0.7 0.58–0.84 0.28 0.22–0.36
(c) Anthropogenic factors
Road density
 0.001 1 897 1.00 1.00
0.0011–0.002 1 849 0.73 0.61–0.87 0.68 0.54–0.86
0.0021–0.005 2 538 0.69 0.58–0.82 0.46 0.36–0.58
 0.0051 1 082 4 3.32–4.82 6.82 5.29–8.80
Density of human population (km2)
 100 2 206 1.00 1.00
100.01–300 3 744 0.86 0.72–1.02 0.57 0.45–0.72
300.01–600 758 2.61 2.15–3.18 4.18 3.19–5.46
 600.01 658 5.56 4.62–6.68 11.61 9.04–14.90
Distance to the closest highway (km)
 50.01 1 021 1.00 1.00
20.01–50 2 109 0.76 0.64–0.91 0.52 0.41–0.66
5.01–20 2 494 1.19 0.99–1.43 1.28 1.01–1.64
 5 1 742 1.96 1.63–2.35 2.84 2.21–3.63
Distance to the closest highway junction (km)
 100.01 1 964 1.00 1.00
50.01–100 2 569 0.78 0.66–0.94 0.78 0.61–0.99
20.01–50 1 863 2.09 1.75–2.51 2.81 2.19–3.60
 20 970 6.15 5.13–7.38 9.46 7.38–12.13
Distance to the closest major city (km)
 80.01 3 427 1.00 1.00
40.01–80 2 176 1.15 0.96–1.37 1.02 0.80–1.30
20.01–40 965 1.78 1.48–2.15 2.06 1.60–2.66
 20 798 4.14 3.44–4.98 7.12 5.53–9.15
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The results of the multivariate analysis suggest
that both explanations may be valid. When, for
example, we considered chickens, we found
that the relative risk in ducks and several other
risk factors were signiﬁcant when adjusted for
each other in the ﬁnal model. Furthermore,
the model for chickens and the model for ducks
indicated a common set of risk factors.
Second, our results were consistent with pre-
vious studies on ecological risk factors of HPAI
in Thailand [8, 9]. However, adding on to pre-
vious work, our analysis made it possible to
identify classes of values associated with higher
risk, which provides greater detail regarding the
possible role of ecological risk factors. A high
HPAI risk was associated with a high density
of free-grazing ducks (> 10 ducks per km2),
more than one rice crop per year, and a short
distance to a river ( 2 km). Altitude may be
considered as an indicator of other unmeasured
environmental variables related to HPAI
risk. Subdistricts with a low average altitude
( 50 m) were associated with a high risk of
HPAI. The mixture of wetlands, ponds, irriga-
tion networks and agriculture in these areas
combined with intensive land use [9], may have
constituted a favourable environment for the
HPAI H5N1 virus. In contrast, subdistricts with
Figure 3. Spatial distribution of the main anthropogenic indicators associated with the relative risk for
HPAI H5N1 in chicken and duck ﬂocks: population density, location of major cities and highways. (A color
version of this ﬁgure is available at www.vetres.org.)
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a medium altitude (50.01–400 m) have higher
slopes and a land cover dominated by forests
and permanent vegetation [9]. Medium average
altitude in subdistricts associated with low RR
was found to constitute a kind of protective fac-
tor regarding HPAI risk. We also provide new
insight into the role of factors related to poultry
farming in the spread of HPAI. Like Tiensin
et al. [24], we found no indication that native
chickens represent an increased HPAI risk
despite the fact that these chickens are raised in
low biosecurity systems and were affected mas-
sively by the disease (920 out of the 1 158
chicken ﬂocks infected during the second wave).
Conversely, a high density of native chickens
(100–300 and > 300 native chickens/km2)
was associated with RR signiﬁcantly below 1.
In Thailand, wet markets have always been rare
[2] and native chickens mainly are raised for
family consumption using little input and
involving little trading activity. This may have
resulted in a protective effect against HPAI
in subdistricts with a high density of native
chickens. These subdistricts probably were less
exposed to the virus because they were not
connected to trading chains which potentially
spread the disease. In addition, the pre-emptive
culling, which focussed in the beginning on
native chickens around an outbreak, may have
contributed to containing the spread within
these subdistricts. Fighting cocks are believed
to have worsened the HPAI situation in other
Asian countries [29] and in Thailand [22].
The association we found between high
densities of ﬁghting cocks and HPAI risk was
signiﬁcant but weak, as did Gilbert et al. [8].
In Thailand, ﬁghting cocks were also targeted
when control measures were implemented in
2004, with a prohibition on cockﬁghting, com-
pulsory registration, and disease monitoring.
Given their high monetary and cultural value,
roosters receive very special attention from their
owners, who may have changed their practices
early to protect their poultry from the disease.
Together, these two elements may have resulted
in a decreased effect of ﬁghting cock abundance
on the HPAI risk.
Third, we identiﬁed a new set of signiﬁ-
cant risk factors that help to reﬁne the current
understanding of the HPAI H5N1 epidemic in
Thailand. Previous studies have suggested that
broiler and layer ducks do not constitute a risk
factor for HPAI risk in Thailand [8, 9]. In con-
trast, we found a signiﬁcantly increased risk of
HPAI, both in chicken and duck ﬂocks, in areas
with a high density of broiler and layer ducks.
During the period studied, only a quarter of
the total number of broiler and layer ducks were
raised in closed facilities with high biosecurity
systems [20]. Since it has been proven that farm
duck breeds can shed the H5N1 virus with min-
imal clinical signs [11], our results suggest that
farm ducks may also have played the role of
silent carriers during the second wave of the
epidemic, contributing to the spread of the dis-
ease. In addition, an increased risk in duck
ﬂocks was shown for subdistricts with a high
density of broiler and layer chickens (> 500
chicken/km2). In Thailand, broiler and layer
chicken production range from large-scale
industrial farms to small, family-run operations
[24]. The latter refer to small or medium-scale
businesses with links to several middlemen or
companies for the transformation and transpor-
tation of both farm inputs and outputs (feed,
wastes, poultry products. . .) [23]. During the
second wave of the epidemic, it is possible that
biosecurity rules were not applied fully
throughout these complex poultry production
chains, thus resulting in the spread of H5N1
in subdistricts with a high density of broiler
and layer chickens.
Furthermore, we identiﬁed several statisti-
cally signiﬁcant relationships between indica-
tors of human activity and the relative risk for
HPAI in chicken and duck populations. Human
population density was the only anthropogenic
risk factor thus far identiﬁed in previous
research in Thailand. On the contrary to Tiensin
et al. [24], but in accordance with Gilbert et al.
[8, 9], our study found a progressive increase of
HPAI risk with an increase of human popula-
tion density for both chickens and ducks. In
addition, we showed that areas located within
a short distance radius around major cities and
highway junctions constitute ‘‘hot spots’’ for
HPAI risk. Cities are characterised by highly
intense poultry trade activities involving live
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poultry markets, food markets, slaughterhouses,
and poultry plants. This intensity may have
resulted in increased possibilities of virus intro-
duction and spread in surrounding areas. If the
HPAI virus was transported through the road
networks, the subdistricts located a short dis-
tance from the highway junction were more
likely to be in contact with the virus than those
situated further away. Highway junctions thus
may have functioned as ‘‘dissemination nodes’’
for the HPAI H5N1 virus. A signiﬁcant associ-
ation was identiﬁed between a high HPAI risk
and proximity to the closest highway. This
may underline the role of the movement of
poultry and poultry products during the second
wave of the epidemic, not only in the long-dis-
tance spread of the HPAI virus, but also in the
short distance dissemination in the areas sur-
rounding the highways. Free-grazing ducks that
are moved along the central plain for hundreds
of kilometers and are known to be reservoirs of
HPAI may have contributed to the spread of the
disease [8, 20]. Other types of poultry also were
moved from farms to slaughterhouses, markets,
or ﬁghting arenas, while farm inputs and poul-
try products such as eggs, meat, litter, and poul-
try manure were transported along collection
circuits. The movement of live poultry, people,
and infected material may have resulted in the
spread of the virus between houses through
direct or indirect transmission. Subdistricts with
a high road density were associated with an
increased risk of HPAI H5N1. Local poultry
product and by-product business activities
involve frequent contacts which revolve around
road networks. Once the HPAI virus was intro-
duced into a subdistrict, a dense road network
may have facilitated its local spread.
Thus, while the spatial pattern of relative risk
is known to be largely associated with an abun-
dance of free-grazing ducks and rice-cropping
intensity, we found that several indicators of
human activities were also associated with
HPAI risk in Thailand during the second wave
of the epidemic. This suggests that in addition
to the ‘‘rice paddy-free grazing duck system’’,
major cities, the highway network, and local
road networks may also have played key roles
in the spread of HPAI in Thailand. Through
the transportation of potentially infected live
poultry or contaminated poultry products, high-
ways may have contributed to both the long dis-
tance and the local spread of the HPAI H5N1
virus. Local road networks were possibly
involved in short-distance spread. In addition,
major cities and highway junctions may have
functioned as ‘‘dissemination nodes’’ for the
HPAI H5N1 virus through the intense trafﬁc
of poultry products and poultry trading activi-
ties in their surrounding areas. Moreover, our
results suggest that activities related to layer
and broiler ducks may have played a more sig-
niﬁcant role than previously thought, as well as
to a lesser extent – layer and broiler chickens.
To tackle the outbreaks, Thai authorities
implemented different control measures which
evolved over time, but the initial plan aimed to
control poultry product movement countrywide.
Beginning in July 2004, in addition to pre-emp-
tive culling, the movement of poultry and avian
products was restricted within a 5-km radius of
an infected ﬂock; these restrictions were
extended during the second wave. The whole
country was also zoned into 5 areas, and poultry
movements were strictly controlled through 32
check points between zones [4]. This helped to
contain the disease from spreading countrywide.
In addition to this set of control measures, and
because free-grazing ducks were suspected of
being H5N1 HPAI reservoirs, the Thai Govern-
ment encouraged duck producers to change their
practices from a free-grazing to a housed system.
However, farmers were not able to change their
practices in a short period of time [23]. In 2005,
ducks were still allowed to graze in paddy ﬁelds,
but the DLD prohibited long-distance move-
ments.The free-ranging practice became illegal
in March 2006, obliging farmers to house every
duck ﬂock [23]. However, by this time the
epidemic was already under control: the number
of outbreaks had dropped from 1 717 during the
second wave to 75 during the third wave (1 July
2005 to 9 November 2005). Thus, while the
housing of all free-grazing ducks took time
to achieve, restrictions on the long-distance
movements of free-grazing ducks had already
contributed largely to limiting HPAI spread in
Thailand.
The H5N1 virus may now be well estab-
lished in different Southeast Asian countries.
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Despite the implementation of control mea-
sures, it is probable that these countries will
continue to face new outbreaks in poultry.
The conditions under which the virus maintains
itself in the environment are not well known. It
is difﬁcult to prevent virus re-emergence in pos-
sible local persistence spots, or the periodic
reintroduction of the virus [25]. Controlling
the disease within the poultry population is a
critical issue for both the public health and agri-
cultural economic systems. The restructuring of
poultry production from open-housed to closed
systems has started in Thailand but the process
will take time and considerable cooperative
effort. Therefore, to limit the number and size
of future outbreaks in the poultry population,
the focus of efforts should be on controlling
the movement of both live poultry and avian
products.
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